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CASES NOTED
later reexamined in the courts of a sister state on the jurisdictional fact of,
domicile.2 2 The burden is cast upon the party challenging the decree to
show that the divorcing spouse was not a bona fide resident 23 of the state in
which the divorce was granted.2 4 Cognizant of the aforementioned burden
the court granted the injunction in the instant case2a as an incident to the
separation action.
The decision apears to be a natural outgrowth of Williams v. North
Carolina,20 inasmuch as a foreign divorce if granted would adversely affect
the wife's marital status and tend to render ineffectual a separation judgment
in the wife's favor. Therefore it would seem that the migratory spouse is
deprived of a forum to test the question of his bona fide residence in another
jurisdiction. However, after final judgment in the separation suit Garvin v.
Garvin 2T does not preclude the husband from proving a bona fide domicile
in the Virgin Islands or elsewhere, and subsequently instituting a divorce
action.
EQUITY - INJUNCTION AGAINST CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
PROPER WHERE STATUTE ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED
FOUND INAPPLICABLE
Plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the sheriff from confiscating
a miniature bowling alley as a gambling device containing an "element of
chance or unpredictable outcome."' The chancellor's refusal to grant an
injunction was reversed. Held, equity will enjoin a criminal prosecution in-
terfering with a machine where its chance or unpredictability is predicated
on the player's skill instead of its mechanism, rather than undermine the
purpose of a statute by drastically construing it. Deeb v. Stoutamire, 53
So.2d 873 (Fla. 1951).
Traditionally, it has been stated that equity has no jurisdiction to en-
join prosecutions under statutes defining criminal offenses.-' The rationale
for this doctrine has been that the enforcement of the criminal law is a
22. Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 19.
23. See the definition of "bona fide resident" in Sneed v. Sneed, 14 Ariz. 17, 22,
123 Pac. 312, 314 (1912) (". . . one who is in the state to reside permanently, and
who, at least for the time being, entertains no idea of having or seeking a permanent
home elsewhere"); see also Caheen v. Caheen, 233 Ala. 495, 496, 172 So. 618, 619
(1937) ("domicile" and "residence" are used interchangeably in divorce statutes);
Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 19 at 229 (where 'domicile" was defined as a"nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of
legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance").
24. See note 19 supra.
25. Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951); Notes, 25 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 364, 15 ALBANY L. REv. 29 (1951).
26. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
27. 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d (1951).
1. FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1949).
2. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 143 (1950); MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 469-470
(2d ed. 1948); 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISDICTION 978 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
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matter beyond the jurisdiction of chancery,3 that such injunctions would lead
to a great delay in the enforcement of the criminal law. and that there are
adequate remedies at law.5 Also, where there is a mixed question of law and
fact, equity may deny an injunction on the ground that it might necessitate
additional litigation.8 The fact that one will be subjected to the indignities
of criminal prosecution does not, in itself, constitute a ground for injunc-
tion. 7 However, many inroads have been made on the doctrine that equity
will not enjoin criminal prosecutions. Thus, where a city proceeded criminal-
ly against a trespasser while seeking to enjoin his use of city property, the
chancellor halted the criminal proceeding to prevent "double harrassing"
because parties-plaintiff and parties-defendant were the same in both the
equity and criminal proceedings,8 Injunctions have been granted when
statutes were previously declared,9 alleged 10 or found" to be unconstitu-
tional or deemed a condition subsequent;12 but most courts require irre-
3. Generally on the grounds that equity jurisdiction is restricted to safeguarding
civil property rights. Therefore, some of these courts even hold that injunctions restrain-
ing such prosecutions may be ignored without subjecting the party to contempt,
MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 470, 470n (2d ed. 1948). But ef. United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 311 (1947); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
4. Ex parte State ex rel. Martin, 200 Ala. 15, 75 So. 327 (1917); Joyner v. Ham-
mond, 199 Iowa 919, 200 N.W. 571 (1924); Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E,2d
814 (1937); Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App. Div. 242, 194 N.Y. Supp. 225
(4th Dep't), aff'd, 234 N.Y. 542, 138 N.E. 439 (1922); Denton v. McDonald, 104
Tex. 206, 135 S.W. 1148 (1911). This has been viewed as the only persuasive argu-
ment against enjoining criminal prosecutions, 46 YALE L.J. 855 (1937).
5. Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 137 Ohio St. 460, 30 N.E.2d 799 (1940)
(suggesting malicious prosecution actions against arresting officers), 54 HARv. L. REv. 1240
(1941) (criticizing on grounds that malicious prosecution actions are usually futile and
in addition police officers are generally judgment proof); Rutzen v. Belle Fourche, 71
S.D. 10, N.W.2d 517 (1945) (can plead injunctive grounds as a defense in criminal
trial), 46 YALE L.I. 855 (1937) (that this view overlooks loss of reputation suffered
as a result of criminal prosecution; also, time consumed at trial would otherwise be
available to petitioner to obtain livelihood); Denton v. McDonald, supra note 4 (could
secure dismissal by writ of habeas corpus).
6. Reed v. Littleton, supra note 4 (should equity decide the facts against the
petitioner, it is not res judicata, and he has right to trial in subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion). But cf. Huntwortb v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 15 Pac. 523 (1915) (in seeking
injunction, defendant waives jury trial).
7. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Miami v. Sutton, 181 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950); see
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941). For criticism of this view see 54 HARv. L.
REv. 1240 (1941), 46 YALE L.J. 855 (1937).
8. Mayor~of York v. Pilkington, 2 Atk. 302, 26 Eng. Rep. 584 (Ch. 1742); c.
Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Ferguson, 133 Fla. 634, 182 So. 842 (1938). For
discussion of American acceptance of this rule see 17 Cm-KENT REV. 83 (1938).
9. Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass, 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946).
10. Blitch v. Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 (1940); Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State
ex rel. Ferguson, supra note 8. Contra: Miami v. Sutton, supra note 7; cf. Watson V.
Buck, supra note 7; Rawls v. Miami, 82 Fla. 65, 89 So. 351 (1921).
11. Loftin v. Miami, 53 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1951).
12. Mizelle v. Sweat, 130 Fla. 345. 177 So. 709 (1937).
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parable injury to personal' 3 or property rights' 4 to be shown also. Upon a
showing of irreparable injury, an injunction has been awarded because the
statute tinder which petitioner would have been prosecuted was declared
inapplicable.1 5 Injunctions are also issued to prevent multiplicity of criminal
actions for the alleged criminal offense,'6 criminal prosecution and seizure
where plaintiff's property is damaged if there can be no appeal' or prose-
cutions made in bad faith."' When an injunction is dissolved after deter-
mination that the statute involved is constitutional, the courts are divided
as to whether the petitioner should be penalized for his criminal activity
during the time the interlocutory injunction was in effect.' 9
The courts of Florida have modified the traditional doctrine and have,
in "proper" cases, enjoined criminal prosecutions. 20 By so doing, they ap-
parently have been striving to safeguard individual and property rights against
unnecessary criminal prosecutions. This appears true even in cases where
injunctions have been denied;21 yet when criminal prosecutions have been
13. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915);
Watson v. Centro Espafiol de Tampa, 158 Fla. 796, 30 So.2d 288 (1947); Kenyon v.
Chicopee, supra note 9; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930).
14. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Packard v. Blanton, 264
U.S. 140 (1924); L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1932); Brown
v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737, 145 Pac. 561 (1915); Shuman v. Gilbert, 229 Mass. 225,
118 N.E. 254 (1918).
15. The Evelyn D., 14 F.2d 321 (S.D. Ga. 1926); Watson v. Centro Espafiol
de Tampa, supra note 13; Mayo v. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co., 155 Fla. 318, 19 So.2d
867 (1944). Contra: Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, supra note 5.
16. Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920 (1913); Foley v. Ham, 102 Kan. 66,
169 Pac. 183 (1917); Sentinel-News Co. v. Milwaukee, 212 Wise. 618, 250 N.W. 511
(1933). Contra: Bisbee v. Arizona Ins. Agency, 14 Ariz. 313, 127 Pac. 722 (1912);
Bainbridge v. Olan Mills, 207 Ga. 636, 63 S.E.2d 655 (1951).
17. American School of Magnetic Healing v. MeAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902); cf.
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
18. Curtov v. Williams, 105 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); accord, McCor-
mick v. Proctor, 217 N.C. 23, 6 S.E.2d 870 (1940).
19. Hamilton v. Birmingham, 8 Ala. App. 534, 189 So. 776 (1939); State v.
Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051 (1902); State v. Wadhams Oil Co. 149 Wise. 58,
134 N.W. 1121 (1921); see Ray v. Belton, 162 S.W. 1015, 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914)
(penalty recommended). Contra: United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1943); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 130 Minn. 144, 153 N.W. 320 (1915)
(penalty prohibited). The latter cases are approved on the ground that otherwise an
injunction would be of dubious value because petitioner would be unjustifiably penalized
if the judge's determination of the law were reversed on appeal, 92 U. OF PA. L. REv. 321
(1944). Query, should the public's right to deter criminal acts be sacrificed because
petitioner is forced to gamble as to whether his actions are consonant with public policy?
20. Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Ferguson, supra note 8 (parties same in
both equity and criminal suits). Blitch v. Ocala, supra note 10; Gulf Theatres, Inc. v.
State ex rel. Ferguson, supra (plaintiff alleged statute was unconstitutional). Loftin v.
Miami, supra note 11 (ordinance found unconstitutional). Mizelle v. Sweat, supra note
12 (statute held condition subsequent). Watson v. Centro Espafiol de Tampa, supra
note 13 (irreparable injury to individual rights threatened). Miami v. Lithgow, 152 Fla.
394, 12 So.2d 380 (1943); Miami Beach v. Gulf Oil Corp., 141 Fa. 642, 194 So. 236
(1940); Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 368 (1940); Snedigar v.
Keefer, 131 Fla. 191, 179 So. 421 (1938); L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, sup ra note 14
(irreparable injury to property rights threatened). Watson v. Centro Espaftol de Tampa,
supra; Mayo v. Winn & Lovett Grocery Co., supra note 15 (statute held inapplicable).
21. De Carlo v. West Miami, 49 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1950) (plaintiff failed to first
exhaust his administrative remedy under the ordinance). Jacksonville v. Wilson, 157 Fla.
838, 27 So.2d 108 (1946) (statute authorized police to search places licensed to sell
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enjoined, the public interest in combating alleged criminal activity seems to
have been protected. The court in the instant case based its decision on the
finding that a miniature bowling alley on which it is possible to win a free
game by "skill" is outside the scope of the statute outlawing machines which
offer something of value on the basis of chance or unpredictable outcome.
22
Although neither the majority opinion nor counsels' briefs discussed the rule
against enjoining criminal prosecutions, the decree enjoining the sheriff from
taking plaintiff's miniature bowling alley appears to be based also on irre-
parable loss of property due to the threatened seizure and on the inadequacy
of the remedy at law.23 Perhaps those were the considerations that led the
majority to override the dissenting justices' "doubt that equity should inter-
vene in this fashion.
'24
While it may be argued that an injunction is a "harsh proceeding,"25
query, should not the accused be protected against confiscation of his pro-
perty rights in his chattel pending litigation, especially when there is no
adequate remedy at law?28 The state can amply protect the public interest
against abuse of the injunctive process by a petitioner who would "shop" for
a sympathetic judge if it penalizes one who obtains injunctive relief from
criminal prosecution on grounds that are later rejected by an appellate
court.2 17 On the other hand, one seeking an injunction in good faith should
be given the opportunity to risk a penalty, instead of being denied an in-
junction because the court feels the public is not sufficiently protected.
liquor beverages). Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364
(1941); Stocks v. Lee, 144 Fla. 627, 198 So. 211 (1940); Egan v. Miami, 130 Fla. 465,
178 So. 132 (1938) (statute held constitutional). Taylor v. Trianon, Amusement Co.,
146 Fla. 447, 200 So, 912 (1941); Coleman v. Greene, 136 Vla. 276, 186 So. 541 (1939)
(police may prosecute those maintaining a nuisance). Taylor v. Trianon Amusement Co.,
supra; Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v. State ex rel. Jones, 136 Fla. 278, 186 So. 538 (1939)
(police may restrain operation of a nuisance). Vest Palm Beach v. Zellar, 91 Fla. 223,
107 So. 146 (1926) (mandamus available as adequate remedy at law). Sweat v. Daley,
116 Fla. 755, 156 So. 720 (1934) (petitioner's threatened "rights" were of doubtful
validity).
22. FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1949), was also declared inapplicable in Stoutamire v.
Pratt, 148 Fla. 690, 5 So.2d 248 (1941). Contra: Weathers v. Williams, 133 Fla. 367,
182 So. 764 (1938). In both cases a slot machine mechanically operated a horserace
but did not award anything of value. The following machines have been declared illegal
under this statute: Sinclair v. Benton, 152 Fla. 138, 10 So.2d 917 (1942) (slot machine
offered free games when a certain unpredictable combination was registered); Hernandez
v. Graves, 148 Fla. 247, 4 So.2d 113 (1941) ("). Q." machine awarded prize to one
answering an unpredictable question within twenty seconds); Eceles v. Stone, 134 Fla. 113,
183 So. 628 (1938); Weathers v. Williams, supra; Grant v. Stone, 133 Fla. 382, 182 So.
770 (1938); Florida Coin Machine Exchange v. Stone, 133 Fla. 382, 182 So. 770 (1938)
("pin ball" machine score predicated on chance and was "adapted' to gambling). ,
23. See 54 IIARV. L. REv. 1240 (1941); 46 YALz L. J. 855 (1937). Even if pro-
secution of petitioner should be adjudged a miscarriage of justice the state could not be
sued for damages, CHAFEE, Op. cit. supra note 2 at 144. The "remedies" at law against
officers participating in an illegal search and seizure are poignantly discussed by Mr.
Justice Murphy, dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949).
24. Deeb v. Stoutamire, 53 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1951).
25. Deeb v. Stoutamire, supra note 24.
26. See note 23, supra.
27. See note 19, uupra.
